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Introduction  
 
This chapter considers how ordinary citizens deliberate about constitutional norms in mini-publics. 
This is becoming a topic of increasing pertinence,3 particularly in light of the emergence of 
democratic4 and deliberative5 constitutionalisms. Democratic constitutionalists want to increase 
citizen participation in the constitutional process, while deliberative constitutionalists want to 
promote communicative interaction based on arguing in constitutional processes. Elster,6 a key 
protagonist of this latter approach, advocates a set of normative criteria for the optimal deliberative 
constituent assembly, which he suggests should be an elected assembly. We argue that mini-publics, 
assembled through sortition, can meet Elster’s normative criteria, if employed as constituent 
assemblies.  They can also meet the aims of democratic constitutionalists by enabling a diverse 
range of citizens to participate in the constitutional process. In sum, mini-publics advance Elster’s 
normative criteria because they are specially convened assemblies that are flexible in size, would 
not be regulated by the constitution themselves, contain elements of secrecy and publicity, are 
demographically representative, their location is flexible, and they can precede referendums.  
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Indeed, mini-publics are increasingly used in constitutional processes in liberal democracies.7 
However, there has been a lack of research carried out on the quality of deliberation that occurs on 
constitutional issues in mini-publics. To fill this gap, this chapter considers primary data from two 
citizens’ juries in Italy on the federal reform of the Italian state. The project adopted a mixed-
methods approach including pre- and post-questionnaires submitted to the jurors; in depth 
interviews with jurors after the conclusion of the process; participant observation throughout the 
process; and analysis of the speech acts of the jurors. The primary focus of the analysis is on the 
extent to which the discussions were respectful, balanced, justified, and focused on the common 
good, as these are the deliberative norms prioritised in constitutional debates by Elster.8 
 
The chapter proceeds in four sections. Firstly, the emergence of democratic and deliberative 
constitutionalisms is detailed and related to mini-publics. The case is made that constitutional mini-
publics present an important opportunity for citizens to participate deliberatively in the 
constitutional process. The next section introduces the case studies. The third section provides an 
analysis of the extent to which citizens’ juries successfully promoted the selected deliberative 
norms. We conclude by arguing that the citizens’ juries indeed have the potential to combine 
democratic and deliberative constitutional approaches. However, we raise important caveats and 
suggest an agenda for future research in this area. 
 
 
Combining Democratic and Deliberative Constitutionalisms through Mini-Publics  
 
For consistency, we follow Elsters’ definition of ‘constitution’. He suggests that there are three 
related meanings: ‘First, many countries have a set of laws collectively referred to as “the 
constitution”. Second, some laws may be deemed “constitutional” because they regulate matters 
that are in some sense more fundamental than others. And third, the constitution may be 
distinguished from ordinary legislation by more stringent amendment procedures.’9 We interpret 
constitution broadly here, relating to all three senses. 
 
There are numerous approaches advocated and practiced in relation to the formation of 
constitutions, with varying democratic credentials,10 but a focus on democratic processes of 
constitutional formation and amendment seems to be on the increase, in theory and practice. Of 
particular importance to the focus here are democratic constitutionalism, which considers citizen 
participation essential,11 and deliberative constitutionalism, which focuses on the deliberative 
quality of the process.12 Here we argue that mini-publics have the potential to combine both these 
approaches if used as constituent assemblies. They recruit a diverse range of citizens and thereby 
promote democratic constitutionalism. They promote deliberative constitutionalism by meeting 
Elster’s13 normative criteria for a constituent assembly. 
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Starting from a critique of parliamentary sovereignty and the reliance on elected constitutional 
assemblies, democratic constitutionalists instead move to advocate a ‘participatory constituent 
process’ for dealing with constitutional issues. They suggest that such an approach is normatively 
superior as it enables citizens to exercise power over their foundations, providing a sense of 
‘ownership’ and thereby representing an ‘act of completion’ or ‘a final act of closure’.14 The 
formation of the Brazilian constitution is seen as an effective practical example of this approach.15 
In contrast, ‘ironically, older nations in the western liberal tradition from which such calls have 
come have not often themselves extended the idea of democratic governance to constitution-
making’.16 This seems to be changing in recent times, and there have been numerous methods 
advocated to institutionalise a ‘participatory constituent process’.17 One form of institution being 
increasingly advocated for its ability to deliver a ‘participatory constituent process’ is the mini-
public.18  
 
Citizens are recruited on to mini-publics through either random or stratified sampling in order to 
achieve to achieve a representataive or diverse sample of the population. The citizens are then 
assembled to become informed and discuss a topical issue. There are a varitey of types of mini-
public including deliberative polls, citizens’ assemblies, planning cells, consensus conferences, and 
citizens’ juries. There are important differences between theses types,19 but a number of common 
elements too. Participants are often remunerated, the discussions are facilitated, and experts provide 
evidence and information and are then questioned by the participants.20 They are also primarily 
consultative as ‘rarely does the mini-public itself share sovereignty over the decision at hand’21, 
although there are some significant exceptions.22  Our cases considered here are citizens’ juries 
which use a smaller sample of citizens and requires them to produce a collective recommendation 
following deliberation. 
 
Mini-publics have a strong conceptual, empirical, and historical relationship with deliberative 
democracy.23 For this reason they are also often considered to be key institutions for delivering 
deliberative constitutionalism. The central premise of this approach is that ‘deliberation is to be the 
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basis for lawmaking’.24 In Elster’s seminal work he claims that ‘deliberation is more important in 
constitution making than in ordinary legislation’.25 A constitution determines the nature of the 
political system itself, has an indefinite future, and deals with complex issues.26 Furthermore, 
‘deliberation about constitutions…requires a deliberative setting’.27 Of primary importance here is 
interaction based upon arguing rather than bargaining. Elster goes on to suggest that there are a 
number of factors that help determine the extent to which a constituent assembly is orientated 
towards the arguing, rather than bargaining, end of this continuum. These include its size, levels of 
publicity, the presence of force, and the level of self-interest of the participants.  
 
Following a review of numerous constitution-making processes, throughout history and the world, 
Elster28 argues that an optimal constitution-making process would be hourglass-shaped, ‘with 
widely open consultative moments upstream and downstream of the drafting, through popular 
referenda and consultations, but a tiny waist, corresponding to the exclusive and closed moment of 
actual writing, in which a limited number of drafters are preserved from the passions and pressures 
of the outside world’.29 Therefore the hourglass constitutional sequence proposed by Elster30 would 
include a large public and open debate on values; election of delegates to the constituent assembly; 
a closed and private debate amongst these representatives to draft the constitution; public 
consultation and debate to amend the draft, and a referendum to ratify the constitution. He implicitly 
acknowledges, therefore, the arguments from the democratic constitutionalists that popular 
participation in the formation of a constitution enhances the legitimacy and stability of the process 
and resulting document, while maintaining that a representative and deliberative process is also 
required to further enhance legitimacy. It is the design of the constituent assembly specifically that 
is our focus here, as opposed to the broader process. It is at this vital part of the process, in Elster’s 
vision, 31 that citizens are excluded, as he believes that constitutional assemblies should be elected 
through a proportional system. Elster’s point is not necessarily that elections can make the 
constituent assembly accountable to the public, as he suggests this can be provided by the 
referendums he wants to use to ratify constitutions.32 Rather, it is to ensure the constituent assembly 
is representative of the public.33 In contrast, we argue that mini-publics, which engage a random or 
stratified sample of citizens, are descriptively representative of the public. They can make an 
important contribution to moving a constitutional process towards a combination of both 
democratic and deliberative constitutional approaches, as they enable a diverse range of citizens to 
deliberate together on constitutional issues, in a setting conducive to the promotion of key 
deliberative norms. Indeed, in his discussion the bureaux, randomly formed subcommittees used in 
the French constitutional process of 1789 and 1848, Elster34acknowledges bodies formed through 
sortition can be deliberatively superior to elected ones. 
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Elster35 concludes his discussion by setting out normative criteria for the ‘optimal deliberative 
setting’ for a constitution-making process. While Elster favours elected constitutional assemblies36 
as best meeting these criteria, we argue that mini-publics, assembled through sortition, can also 
satisfy this standard. Elster’s37 design features for the ‘optimal design’, which he considers most 
likely to ‘create the optimal conditions’ for ‘genuinely impartial deliberation about the common 
good’, include the following:  
 
 Size: Elster argues that bargaining can only occur in small assemblies and that ‘in large 
fragmented assemblies interaction must take the form of arguing’.38 In order to ensure quality 
deliberation in the process Elster39 advocates for the constituent assembly to be limited in 
participants (50-100) to avoid strategic behaviour and free-riding. This target is perfectly 
achievable for mini-publics. For example, deliberative polls tend to have a 130-500 sample, 
citizen assemblies 100-160 participants, and citizens’ juries 12-25.40 However, Elster41 further 
clarifies that ‘the larger and the more diverse the population, the more delegates are needed to 
ensure a broadly representative assembly.’ Again the use of sampling to form mini-publics can 
accommodate this, a capacity that is especially significant given that diversity (of the assembly) 
is seen as essential by Elster42 if epistemic benefits of deliberation are to be secured. 
 
 Specially convened assemblies: Elster43 highlights that ‘when a body such as parliament is 
involved in shaping the constitution that among other things is to regulate the role of that body, 
it may have a tendency to write an important role for itself into the constitution.’ He argues that 
this can be mitigated if the constitutional assembly is specially convened. Mini-publics meet this 
criterion as they are usually issue-specific and dissolved as soon as the issue has been 
deliberated;44 this would be the case with a mini-public acting as a constitutional assembly. 
Therefore, even if the resulting constitution sets out a significant role for mini-publics in 
general, this would not include the specific mini-public(s) used to assist in the drafting of the 
constitution. 
 
 Not regulated by the constitution themselves: This relates directly to the ‘specially convened 
assemblies’ criteria. Elster states that ‘other institutions or actors whose behaviour is to be 
regulated by the constitution ought not to be part of the constitution-making process.’45 Again, 
as the mini-public(s) acting as the constitutional assembly will be dissolved after the 
constitution is ratified, their activities would not be subject to control by the constitution itself, 
even if subsequent mini-publics would be. There is still the danger that the citizens participating 
in the mini-public would be regulated by the constitution, and could therefore create rights or 
immunities that would inure to their benefit. However, this would be ameliorated by the use of 
                                                            
35 Ibid; Elster, ‘Deliberation’, above n 3. 
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sortition to select the citizen participants as they would be diverse in their interests and more 
impartial.  
 
 Combine elements of secrecy and publicity: On the one hand Elster46 argues that conducting 
constitutional discussions in public reduces the occurrence of self-interested language and 
bargaining and enhances reason giving due the civilising force of hypocrisy: ‘the presence of a 
public makes it especially hard to appear motivated merely by self-interest. Even if one’s fellow 
assembly members would not be shocked, the audience would be’.47 Similarly, in order to 
encourage members of a constituent assembly to engage in meaningful deliberation Elkin48 
argues that ‘lawmakers must be given the opportunity to be seen to deliberate.’ On the other 
hand an audience decreases the likelihood of impartial motives by increasing passionate ones, 
due the effectiveness of rhetoric on the audience, and further decreases the chance of preference 
change in light of the better arguments. Elster consequently concludes that the constitutional 
drafting process should include deliberations operating in secret with those made public.49 
Again mini-publics can be designed to meet this criterion, and often combine secret 
deliberations with those publicly broadcast. Indeed this is a common feature of deliberative 
polls.50  
 
 Demographically representative: Despite favouring elected constitutional assemblies, Elster51 
is himself critical of electoral systems that result in assemblies that are significantly limited in 
the extent to which they are demographically representative of the citizenry. However, he 
maintains that this problem can be addressed by the implementation of proportional electoral 
systems.52 In contrast, mini-publics utilise random or stratified sampling to achieve a 
‘deliberative microcosm’ of the population or at least a ‘demographically diverse’ sample. Each 
citizen has an equal chance of being selected; consequently the system is useful for achieving 
descriptive representation, to an even greater extent than proportional electoral systems.53 
Indeed, in reviewing the Icelandic constitutional process Landemore makes the case for the 
superiority of randomly sampled constitutional assemblies over elected ones: ‘the fact that 
citizens who were ultimately elected had to run a political campaign in order to attract votes 
turned them into professional politicians, or at least ensured that only those acting like 
professional politicians would be elected, thus contradicting the whole premise of having 
regular citizens onboard the Constitutional Assembly.’54 Elster himself reports that in the 
French constitutional assemblies of 1789 and 1848 the bureaux had a random composition, 
which promoted impartiality and thereby deliberation over bargaining.55 Although not 
advocating the use of mini-publics himself in the constitutional process, Elkin highlights that 
                                                            
46 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3; ‘The Optimal Design’, above n 4. 
47 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3, 111. 
48 Above n 3, 52. 
49 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3, 117. It should, however, be noted that more recently Elster (in ‘The Optimal Design’, above 
n 4) has revised his opinion, suggesting that the whole constituent assembly process should proceed behind closed doors 
to encourage participants to change their mind in light of the best reasons offered.  
50 James Fishkin and Robert C Luskin, ‘Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls: Aspirations and Effects’ (2005) 36 British 
Journal of Political Science 184. 
51 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3. 
52 Ibid 99. 
53 Elstub, above n 18. 
54 Above n 17, 186. 
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‘the citizens of a republican regime must have the experience of deliberating and struggling over 
the content of the public interest themselves if they are to judge the inclinations and capacities 
of their lawmakers. There is, however, good reason to suppose that the ability to make the 
necessary judgments about lawmakers is not to be found widely distributed amongst citizens in 
the absence of experiences that promote it.’56 Elkin continues to argue that observing others 
deliberating is not an adequate replacement for participating in it oneself. Mini-publics enable a 
diverse set of citizens to engage in such deliberation, and if used more widely and regularly, the 
experience of engaging in deliberation amongst a citizenry could be effectively enhanced.  
 
 Flexible location: Concerned that constituent assemblies can be disrupted by mass 
demonstrations, Elster57 suggests that the assembly should not be held in any major city. Again, 
the flexibility of mini-publics is a strength here: as they are specially convened, they can be held 
in any location deemed suitable for the process, providing the travel and accommodation costs 
of the citizen participants can be covered. However, these costs would also have to be met for 
elected representatives. 
 
 Can precede referendums: there are several examples of mini-publics preceding referendums 
in constitutional processes (for example in Iceland58) and in the citizens’ assemblies in British 
Columbia and Ontario they were used to determine the referendum options themselves.59 
Moreover, MacKenzie and Warren’s evidence from the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly 
suggests that mini-publics could be ‘trusted information proxies’ for the public when deciding 
how to vote in a referendum, precisely because they are made up of ‘people like them.’60  
 
In recent times mini-publics have played important roles in constitutional processes in Canada,61 the 
Netherlands,62 Iceland,63 Belgium,64 and Ireland.65 Research on these mini-publics has significantly 
advanced our understanding of the potentials and pitfalls of using mini-publics in constitutional 
processes. However, to date, there has been little research on the quality of deliberation in mini-
publics considering constitutional issues. Although there have been important studies on the 
deliberative quality occurring in mini-publics more generally,66 these were not specifically 
addressing constitutional issues. For Elster it seems apparent that certain norms of deliberation are 
more important in constitutional discussions than others. In sum, Elster thinks it is essential to have 
                                                            
56 Elkin, above n 3, 54. 
57 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3, 117. 
58 Landemore, above n 17. 
59 Fournier et al, above n 17. 
60 Michael K MacKenzie and Mark E Warren, ‘Two Trust-based Uses of Minipublics in Democratic Systems’, in John 
Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds), Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 95-124. 
61 Warren and Pearse, above n 17; Fournier et al, above n 17; Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, above n 17. 
62 Fournier et al, above n 17; Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, above n 17. 
63 Landemore, above n 17. 
64 Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, above n 17. 
65 Suiter et al. 2016; Caluwaerts and Reuchamps ibid. 
66 Alice Siu, Look Who’s Talking: Examining Social Influence, Opinion Change and Argument Quality in Deliberation 
(PhD Thesis, Stanford University, USA, 2009); David Sanders, ‘The Effects of Deliberative Polling in an EU-Wide 
Experiment: Five Mechanisms in Search of an Explanation’ (2012) 42(3) British Journal of Political Science 617; 
Marlene Gerber et al, ‘Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Persuasion: Mechanisms of Opinion Formation in EuroPolis’ 
(2014) 15(3) European Union Politics 410. 
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‘genuinely impartial deliberation about the common good.’67 To achieve impartiality there must be 
respect and balance to the discussions. To be genuinely deliberative participants must justify their 
preferences with reasons,68 and should be orientated towards promoting the common good.69 
Consequently, in order to advance our understanding of whether mini-publics can indeed meet the 
criteria of being the ‘deliberative setting’ Elster considers so essential for constitutional assemblies, 
while at the same time enabling the citizen participation demanded by democratic constitutionalists, 
we analyse the extent to which citizens’ juries on Federal reform in Italy successfully promoted 
respectful and balanced reasoning on the common good. We now move to introduce our case 
studies in more detail.  
 
Citizens’ Juries on the Federal Reform of the Italian State  
 
This section presents the salient details of the citizens’ juries on the federal reform of the Italian 
State and the methodology employed to study them. First of all, in order to better comprehend the 
context in which these juries took place, we briefly retrace the structure of the Italian State and its 
evolution in the last few decades.  
 
The Italian State is structured in 20 Regions that have had limited functions since their creation, 
except for five of them (the ‘Special Statutes Regions’) that obtained a wide legislative and fiscal 
autonomy due to historical-geographic or ethno-linguistic reasons. The consistent electoral support 
gained by an autonomist party in the North of the country since the 1992 election – the Northern 
League Party – has put federal reform on the national agenda for a considerable time, receiving 
attention both by main right wing and left wing parties.  
 
The most controversial aspect of the debate refers to the fiscal implications of federalism, due to the 
fact that Italy has among the most relevant internal socio-economical cleavages in Europe. The 
fiscal redistribution from the Centre-North of the country towards the South has traditionally been 
impressive and the federal reform of the State could change this consolidated equilibrium. Indeed, 
the main declared purpose of the North League Party in seeking federal reform has continuously 
been to reduce the level of this redistribution.   
 
A constitutional reform proposal that was approved by a centre-left coalition Parliament and later 
confirmed by a national referendum in 2001 initiated the transition toward a federalist structure of 
the State, devolving some legislative power to Regions and recognizing a proper fiscal power for 
them. In 2009 a large majority in the Parliament approved a general law (law 42/2009) to concretely 
foster the fiscal power for Regions recognised by the 2001 Constitutional reform. However, the 
implementation of the reform could start only after the approval of eight other highly technical 
decrees by the Government in the next two years and it therefore proceeded very slowly. In 2016 
another constitutional reform introducing a Senate elected by regional councils was approved by the 
Parliament but rejected by referendum.  
 
Therefore federalism is an ongoing process that is far from resolution, even after more than 15 years 
of prominence on the Italian political agenda. As part of the Biennial Festival of Democracy, a 
                                                            
67 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3, 116. 
68 Elster, ‘Deliberation’, above n 3, 101; ‘The Optimal Design’, above n 4, 150; Elkin, above n 3, 42. 
69 Elster, ‘The Optimal Design’, above n 4, 150. 
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cultural event supported by the City Council of Turin and several not for profit foundations, four 
citizens’ juries on the federal reform of the State in three different cities were organised: two in 
Turin (North Italy), one in Florence (Centre Italy) and one in Lamezia Terme (South Italy) in the 
period December 2010-April 2011. The overall project was coordinated by the University of Turin 
and supervised by a Guarantee Board composed of 11 experts with diverse views on federalism. 
The project was launched by the organisers in an open seminar on the 3rd December 2010 when a 
first report was circulated. It illustrated what federalism is in general terms; what the main reforms 
approved or under discussion in Italy have been; and the major arguments in favour or against the 
reform. It was then delivered to the randomly-selected jurors of the first jury in Turin. Moreover 
this first report was made freely available via 130,000 copies in Turin with the newspaper La 
Stampa in the 8th April 2011 issue.70  
 
After this first jury, a second more extensive document illustrating different scenarios for the federal 
reform in Italy was produced by the organisers and delivered to the jurors in the second jury of 
Turin. This second report was also delivered to the participants in the other two juries.71 The final 
recommendations of the juries were presented and discussed in a public seminar in Turin, on 16th 
April 2011. Both the reports and final recommendations of all the juries have been published on the 
related website which, in the period December 2010-April 2011, received about 4,000 individual 
visits.  
 
The analysis presented in this article regards the two citizens’ juries in Turin.6 The first jury was 
held on the 10th-11th December 2010 and included 25 randomly selected jurors and 7 witnesses (all 
of them were experts from universities or other research institutions). The second jury was held on 
the 4th-5th March 2011 and included 42 randomly selected jurors72 and 8 witnesses (5 experts and 3 
political actors). The ‘process tracing’ methodology, also called ‘causal-process observation’, was 
adopted.73 It aims to explain what really happened during the implementation process of the juries 
on the basis of data collected through a combination of several methods: 
 
• Direct observation of all plenary sections and 8 discussion sessions of both juries (over 22 
sessions).  
• Transcription of 15 discussion sessions from both juries. This produced 1,093 speech acts of 
jurors which were coded through 11 items presented in the Table 174: the length of each 
speech act has been measured; the arguments (where present) have been identified and their 
quality has been evaluated; the general orientation toward federalism (when attributable) 
has been signalled. Moreover, we refer to the analysis by Ravazzi75 about the 570 speech 
acts of facilitators.  
                                                            
70Other articles covering the conclusion of the jury are: Emanuela Minucci, Fisichella, Ricolfi e Zagrebelsky "Quale 
federalismo per l'Italia?, La Stampa, 16/04/2011, p.64 and Letizia Tortorello, Partono da Piazza Carignano le prove 
generali di federalismo, La Stampa, 17/04/2011, p.65. 
71 The other two juries took places on the 4th April 2011 (Florence) and on the 8th-9th April 2011 (Lamezia Terme). 
The case study has been realised inside wider research on the quality of deliberation directed by Luigi Bobbio, and the 
overall results of the research have been published (Bobbio, 2013).   
72 15 of them had just taken part to the first jury, while other 27 jurors were new participants. 
73 David Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing’ (2011) 4 Political Science and Politics 823. 
74 In order to test the intercoder agreement, a subset of the speech acts has been recoded: the correspondence of 
codification for each item was equal to, or higher than, 90%.  
75 Stefania Ravazzi ‘Facilitare la deliberazione. Il ruolo dei professionisti’, in Luigi Bobbio (ed.), La qualità della 
deliberazione, (Carocci, 2013) pp. 147-78.  
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• Two questionnaires for jurors, elaborated by the University of Siena, were collected. One 
before the beginning and one after the conclusion of juries. Table 2 presents the survey 
items that formed the basis of our analysis here. The first three items were included only in 
the questionnaire after the conclusion of the juries because they concerned the issues of 
respect between jurors and the balance of arguments made in the jury discussions. The 
fourth items were included both in the questionnaires before the beginning and after the 
juries in order to measure the opinion change toward federalism of jurors.  
• A subsample of 16 jurors were interviewed in depth after the conclusion of the process. 
These jurors were asked to express their opinions and perceptions about the relationships 
established with the other jurors, the facilitators and the experts, the development of the 
discussions, and the final results of the jury.  
 
 
Table 1. The analysis of the speech acts of jurors   
Items  Modalities  
 
Length of speech acts  
 
 
Number of characters:.....  
 
Pertinence  
 
0) No; 1) Yes  
 
 
Level of inference of argument  
 
0) no argument in the speech act 1) argument with incomplete 
inference 2) argument with complete inference  
 
 
Level of generality of argument  
 
0) no argument in the speech act 1) argument referring to 
personal interest 2) argument referring to group interest 3) 
argument referring to general interest or marginalized groups 
interest  
 
Orientation toward federalism  -2) very much against -1) quite a lot against 0) neutral or not 
attributable 1) quite a lot in favour 2) very much in favour  
 
 
 
Table 2. The questionnaires for jurors   
Items   Modalities  Questionnaire  
 
My fellow jurors have respected what I said 
even when they did not agree with me  
 
level of agreement with the  
After the juries 
statement on a scale 0-10  
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During the discussion I have had extensive 
opportunities to express my opinions  
 
level of agreement with the  
After the juries 
statement on a scale 0-10  
Some participants have been more active 
than me in the discussion?  
 
Not at all/a little  
Somewhat                        After the juries 
Quite a lot/very much 
 
Piedmont should be able to decide 
autonomously how to satisfy the needs of 
its residents  
 
-2) very against -1) fairly against  
Before and after  
0) abstension 1) fairly in favour 2)  
the juries very 
much in favour  
 
Constitutional Deliberation in the Citizens’ Juries  
 
In this section we present and discuss the findings derived from our analysis that refer to the four 
privileged deliberative norms: the level of respect, the balance, degree of reasoning and the focus on 
the common good within the jury discussions.  
 
Respect  
 
The observation of the process evidenced a high level of respect among jurors. No episodes were 
observed in which verbal interactions among jurors were disrespectful, even where there was strong 
disagreement. The highly respectful climate of the discussion was also strongly confirmed by jurors 
themselves through the anonymous answers to the final questionnaire and in the in-depth interviews 
to a subsample of them. As is shown in Table 3, jurors perceived a high level of respect even in 
cases of disagreement. Along a scale 0-10 the average level of respect perceived by jurors is over 8 
and the standard deviation is low, less than 2. In the sixteen in-depth interviews none of the jurors 
referred to disrespectful episodes in which they were involved or observed; moreover several 
interviewees referred to be particularly impressed by the high level of respect.  
 
 
Table 3. The perception of jurors about respect  
  First jury  Second 
jury  
My fellow jurors have 
respected what I said 
even when they did 
not agree with me  
Average level of agreement with the statement  
(0-10)  
Standard deviation  
8.9  
1.4  
8.4  
1.6  
(Number of answering jurors)  (21)  (42)  
 (Number of not answering jurors)  (1)  (0)  
 
 
This highly respectful climate induced jurors to perceive a high level of freedom of expression as is 
shown by Table 4: the average level of perception of having the opportunity to extensively express 
one’s own opinion is above 8 along a 0-10 scale and the standard deviation is less than 2.  
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Table 4. The perception of jurors about the freedom of expression  
  First jury  Second 
jury  
During the discussion I 
have had extensive  
opportunities to express 
my opinions  
Average level of agreement with the statement  
(0-10)  
Standard deviation  
8.2  
1.8  
8.2  
1.6  
(Number of answering jurors)  (21)  (42)  
 (Number of not answering jurors)  (1)  (0)  
 
Also the interviewees comprehensively confirmed this perception. For example:  
 
At the beginning there was a little embarrassment... as happens among people who do not 
know each other... but in a short time the embarrassment disappeared. I did not find any 
barrier to express myself. We were all quite relaxed (I. 6).76  
 
The discussion has certainly been open to different positions. I have clearly noticed that 
there were two main opposing ideas... but it has really been a free and peaceful discussion (I. 
4).77  
 
Balance  
 
The observers suggested that there was an unbalanced participation in the discussions: some jurors 
appeared particularly active, intervening several times in each session and with longer speech acts 
where others seemed to be more passive. The more active participants were also the more educated. 
The existence of an asymmetry in the active participation in the discussion is confirmed both by the 
questionnaire after the conclusions of the juries and the analysis of the speech acts.   
 
As can be seen in Table 5, almost half of the jurors recognised that some other participants had been 
more active in the discussion. Table 6 provides evidence that the arguments are concentrated in the 
minority of the speech acts that are longer than 400 characters78 and there is a moderate positive 
correlation between the length of speech acts and the recourse to argumentation (r = 0,52). In other 
words, the jurors who spoke more were reasonably more able to influence the development of the 
discussion not only because of the time they used, but also because they were able to communicate 
in a more complex way.  
 
 
                                                            
76 Middle-aged male juror from Jury 1 interviewed in Torino, 20/12/2010. 
 
77 Middle-aged female juror from jury 1 interviewed in Torino, 21/12/2010 
78 The observed differences are statistically significant (qui-squared test: χ2 = 339; p< 0.01).  
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Table 5. The perception of jurors about the active participation in the discussion  
  First jury 
(N. of jurors)  
Second 
jury  
(N. of 
jurors)  
Some participants 
have been more active 
than me in the 
discussion?  
 
Not at all/a little  
Somewhat  
Quite a lot/very much  
4  
4  
10  
10  
 8  
21 
(Number of answering jurors)  (18)  (39)  
 (Number of not answering jurors)  (4)  (3)  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. The length of speech acts of jurors  
Length speech acts 
(N. of characters)  
Number of 
speech acts 
without 
argument  
Number of speech 
act with argument  Total number 
of speech 
acts  
< 200  769  27  796  
200-400  100  41  141  
>400  66  90  156  
Tot  935  158  1093  
 
 
On the one hand this imbalance could be evaluated in negative terms, because any kind of 
imbalance could actually be considered undesirable from a deliberative perspective. On the other 
hand, however, it could be considered that inside real mini-publics it is not possible to cancel all the 
asymmetries. Consequently, a certain degree of imbalance in active participation in the discussion 
that is referable to pre-existent diversities in education, social skills and personal attitudes of jurors 
is quite acceptable. This is particularly the case if there is a high level of respect, a wide perception 
of freedom of expression and the avoidance of other more relevant kinds of undesirable influences 
such as the manipulation by facilitators, the conformist polarization of jurors towards the pre-
existing majoritarian orientation and the partisan influence by witnesses. Indeed, this is what was 
found in the citizens’ juries in Turin.  
 
For example, as we have just highlighted above, the respect among jurors has been high and also the 
perception of a freedom of expression was widespread. The analysis of the speech acts of 
facilitators clearly demonstrates that for the most part they repeated or summarised statements of 
jurors, recalled rules, times and topics under discussion, asked jurors to argue, and stimulated more 
passive jurors to intervene. They did not force jurors towards a positive view about federalism nor 
toward a negative view of the constitutional issues being discussed.79  
                                                            
79 Ravazzi, ‘Facilitare la Deliberazione’ note 73 above 147-78. 
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There is much evidence that testifies that polarization did not take place, even if at the beginning of 
the two juries there was a majority of jurors in favour of federalism, as you can see from Table 7: 34 
jurors supporting federalism while only 4 jurors contesting it and another 14 uncertain or not 
answering. At first, as you can see from Table 8, the majority of speech acts in all the sessions are 
not oriented and therefore, for the most part, the discussion could not produce a pressure toward a 
univocal orientation.  Secondly, there is no significant difference about the length of the speech 
acts80 and the presence of argument81 between speech acts supporting and opposing federalism and 
it confirms the climate of freedom of expression for both sides. Thirdly, the unbalance in the 
oriented speech acts affected who were in the majority at the beginning and not who was in the 
minority (119 speech acts opposing federalism against 61 supporting federalism, Table 8) in 
contrast to what we would expect to find had polarization occurred.  
 
 
Table 7. The orientation of jurors towards federalism before the beginning of juries  
  Number 
of 
jurors  
Piedmont should be able to decide 
autonomously how to satisfy the needs 
of  
its residents  
Fairly in favour and very much in 
favour  
Fairly against and very against  
Abstentions/no answer  
34  
  4 
14  
 Total*  52  
* jurors of the first jury+new recruited jurors for the second jury  
 
Table 8. Speech acts supporting and opposing federalism and the use of arguments  
 Number of Speech 
acts without 
argument  
Number of speech act 
with argument  
Total number of 
speech acts  
Supporting federalism*  31  30  61  
Opposing federalism**  67  52  119  
Tot.  97  83  180  
* quite a lot in favour + very much in favour **quite a lot against + very much against  
 
 
The witnesses, as evident in several in-depth interviews, played a relevant role in shaping the 
opinion of jurors. In the first jury all the witnesses were experts from universities or research centres 
and they had a deep knowledge of the ongoing process of transition towards federalism. Therefore 
most of them focused the current technical restrictions of such transition rather than exploring the 
possible long-term future scenarios or the systemic effects of federal reform. In this way they were 
able to transmit to jurors relevant specific knowledge about the topic, but they also, at the same 
time, act as a sort of cognitive barrier for the discussion. In order to overcome this overly narrow 
                                                            
80 qui-squared test: χ2  = 1,6; p = 0,45  
81 qui-squared test: χ2  = 0,8; p = 0,36  
15 
 
perspective the organisers introduced two adjustments for the second jury. Firstly, a new 
informative document explicitly presenting different future scenarios for a federal reform in which 
Regions received different degrees of fiscal autonomy, independently from the current restrictions. 
Secondly, the recruitment of three local political actors with opposite orientation about federalism 
as witnesses, in order to avoid an excessively technical level of discussion. Of particular importance 
is that, even if witnesses had an influence on the discussion, there is no evidence to suggest that 
they influenced the jurors in a univocal and partisan manner.  
 
Reasoning and common good  
 
The analysis of the speech acts highlights that the communicative interactions among participants 
have been nuanced: a high level of pertinence and of reference to the common good combined with 
a varied use of arguments that have generally been incomplete.  
 
The pertinence of a speech act refers to its connection with the general topic under discussion. A 
speech act is pertinent when its content is connected to the topic and this connection is 
understandable. The pertinence of speech acts have been high all over the development of the 
process, as one can see in Table 9 (70,2% of average pertinent speech acts in the first jury and 
75,1% in the second jury). Moreover the reference to common good was almost generalized: 89,2% 
of all arguments referred to general interest or to marginalized group interest, whereas only 6,8% 
referred to group interest and 4% to personal interest (Table 10). On the whole these findings 
clearly support the idea that lay citizens inside a mini-public are enabled to discuss complex topics 
like federalism with a consistent capacity to focus on the content of the issue, avoiding at the same 
time a particularistic perspective.   
 
The inference of arguments refers to the cause-effect connections expressed in a speech act. The 
inference is complete when the links between the supposed causes and effects are explained. The 
inference is incomplete when a causal relationship is adduced without justifying the connections 
that give validity to the relationship. Our evidence indicates that the level of inference of arguments 
was generally incomplete and that the use of argument by participants was not constant, swinging 
between sessions in which the majority of speech acts contained at least one argument and sessions 
in which arguments were really rare (Table 9).  Two explanations shed light on this phenomenon, 
each with different implications.   
 
A first explanation focuses on the fact that for a considerable part of the time, the jurors’ discussions 
focused on identifying the questions for witnesses and summarising information received from 
them. It is therefore perfectly understandable that the use of arguments is low. The purpose of these 
kinds of communicative interactions among jurors, in fact, is to enhance the shared knowledge on 
the issue under discussion and it is clearly consistent with the deliberative perspective.  
 
 
Table 9. Pertinence and argumentation in the speech acts of jurors  
Jury  Session  % of pertinent speech acts  
% of pertinent speech acts 
with argument  
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First jury  
I  
II  
III  
IV  
66,7%  
79,4%  
55,9%  
66,4%  
53,3%  
51,9%  
31,6%  
16,1%                    
 V  77,8%  40,5%  
 VI  100,0%  6,7%  
 Total  70,2%  30,5%  
Second jury  
I  
II  
III  
IV  
V  
VI  
98,8%  
93,9%  
82,0%  
51,2%  
51,5%  
68,1%                                  
13,9%  
12,9%  
32,0%   
  9,1% 
11,4%  
2,2% 
 VII  77,1%  3,7%  
 VIII  94,9%  5,4%  
 IX  67,3%  22,5%  
 Total  75,1%  13,6%  
First + second jury  73,7%  18,4%  
 
 
Table 10. Level of inference and level of generality of the pertinent arguments  
  Number of 
pertinent 
arguments  
 
% of 
arguments  
Level of inference of 
arguments  
Complete 
Incomplete  
24  
124  
16.2%  
83.8%  
 Tot.  148  100%  
Level of generality of 
arguments  
Personal interest  
Group interest  
General interest or marginalised group 
interest  
6  
10  
132  
4.0%  
6.8%  
89.2%  
 Tot.  148  100%  
 
A second explanation highlights that lay citizens prefer to narrate than to argue; when they argue, 
they generally use implicit and not well-developed arguments. This raises the issue of the 
deliberative attitude of participants, suggesting that it cannot be considered natural or be taken for 
granted. Of particular importance in this regard is the analysis by Ravazzi82 on the speech acts of 
facilitators inside these juries. Her analysis in fact shows that facilitators contributed to enhance the 
level of the debate in several ways: completing the argument proposed by jurors, highlighting the 
logic or practical consequences of such statements, or playing the role of devil’s advocate. 
Moreover, it demonstrates that facilitators were able to enhance the use of arguments: 
                                                            
82 Above n 73. 
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approximately 15% of the speech acts of facilitators involved asking a specific juror to provide a 
justification: this request was effectively satisfied in the 68% of cases.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Elster83 favours elected constitutional assemblies to provide ‘deliberative settings’ in the 
constitutional process. In contrast, we have argued that mini-publics are well placed to meet Elster’s 
normative criteria for the optimal deliberative setting for a constitution-making process.84 Elster85 
wants the deliberative setting to produce ‘genuinely impartial deliberation about the common 
good’.86 To determine whether mini-publics can indeed meet this criteria for a deliberative setting, 
we have analysed the debates in two citizens’ juries on federal reform in Italy around four central 
deliberative norms: level of respect, overall balance, extent of reasoning and focus on the common 
good. From our analysis, we found much evidence that the discussions were respectful, balanced 
and orientated to the common good. However, all things considered the quality of reasoning was not 
strong. This is an important discrepancy, and not one that should be dismissed lightly if mini-
publics are to be considered as constituent assemblies.  
 
There are of course further failings of mini-publics that would limit the extent mini-publics should 
be used as constituent assemblies, in addition to the lack of quality of reasoning that we found. 
Lafont argues mini-publics are an example of ‘elite deliberation’ as the views of the citizens that 
participate in the mini-public are transformed through the process and are no longer representative 
of those of the broader public excluded from the mini-public. 87  Consequently, employing mini-
publics to shape a constitution is either an illegitimate or superfluous process that ultimately 
requires non-participants to ‘blindly defer’ to the deliberations of the few who are selected, which 
‘weakens the feedback loop between political decision-making and actual deliberation in the 
broader public sphere.’ Moreover, Böker and Elstub88 argue that as mini-publics are artificially 
designed and controlled instruments, they potentially contradict the critical, emancipatory edge of 
deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, we still believe the evidence suggests that mini-publics can 
play an important role in constitutional processes and help synthesise the democratic and 
deliberative approaches to constitutionalism. A key challenge is to identify the optimum role for 
mini-publics in constitution-making, and we hope our evidence has made a contribution here by 
highlighting their strengths and weaknesses with respect to generating key deliberative norms 
required in an ideal constitution-making process. Although we have focused on the micro dynamics 
of mini-publics in our study, these are interlinked with the macro aspects in important ways.89 
 
For example, because the discussions in mini-publics are respectful, balanced and orientated to the 
common good, but lack quality reasoning, we suggest that their role should be reviewing the 
arguments generated from other parts of the constitutional process, rather than providing these 
themselves. They could then run alongside an elected constituent assembly, and act as a filter in the 
                                                            
83 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3; ‘The Optimal Design’, above n 4. 
84 Above n 3. 
85 ‘Deliberation’, above n 3, 116. 
86 See also Elkin, above n 3, for a similar set of requirements. 
87 Cristina Lafont, ‘Deliberation, Participation, and Democratic Legitimacy: Should Deliberative Mini-publics Shape 
Public Policy?’ (2014) 23(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 40, 48. 
88 Above n 57. 
89 Bächtiger et al, above n 1, 230. 
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process. In essence, arguments that jurors agreed could not stand the test of publicity, and that they 
considered were not orientated towards the common good, could then be filtered out by the mini-
public (or at least flagged as inadequate, for further discussion in the public sphere and elected 
constituent assembly). If the mini-public’s reasoning here received sufficient media attention and 
exposure, broader deliberation in the formal and informal public sphere could be generated.90 Media 
reform would though be required to make this viable and desirable due to its current deliberative 
inadequacies,91 but a more routine and embedded use of mini-publics in constitutional processes 
could also help, where mini-publics could act as intermediaries between actors with competing 
logics such as citizens, experts, and the media.92 Interestingly, Mongolia has recently passed a law 
requiring the use of deliberative polls in advance of all constitutional amendments.93 This represents 
an ideal environment for further research on these issues. 
 
To further set the agenda for research in this area, it is important to highlight some limitations in our 
own project. Firstly, we considered citizens’ juries. However, larger citizens’ assemblies have been 
more commonly utilised in constitutional processes, and therefore, given that there are some 
important differences between these types of mini-public,94 more research is required on 
deliberative quality in citizens’ assemblies on constitutional issues. Secondly, the Italian citizens’ 
juries subjected to analysis were part of a research project. Although designed to have impact and 
inform federal debates in Italy, they held no formal institutionalised role. This lack of decision-
making power could well affect the quality of deliberation and particularly the degrees of balance, 
respect, reason-giving and focus on the common good, both negatively and positively. We therefore 
suggest further research on institutionally embedded mini-publics, to see if our findings are 
replicated.  
 
 
                                                            
90 Simon Niemeyer, ‘Scaling-Up Deliberation to Mass Publics: Harnessing Mini-Publics in a Deliberative System’ in 
Kimmo Grönlund, Andre Bächtiger, and Maija Setälä (eds), Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the 
Democratic Process (ECPR Press, 177), 179. 
91 Lafont, above n 88, 58. 
92 Gianfranco Pomatto, ‘Deliberative Mini-Publics: The Best is Yet to Come’, (2016) 52(2-3) Representation, 239-248. 
93 http://cdd.stanford.edu/2017/mongolias-first-national-deliberative-poll-on-constitutional-amendments/ (last visited 
07/07/2017). 
94 Elstub, above n 18. 
